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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that an individualist view of teaching and learning, based on a Cartesian world-view leads to the abdication of responsibility as educators of the emotions. A sociogenic perspective is proposed that urges that schools teach learners how to feel as well as how to learn. The classroom is a setting rich in opportunities for emotional socialization, but it has been neglected as a context for educating the emotions. From a sociogenic point of view, there is no such thing as a level of pure knowledge with no affective dimension. Emotions index the relational process, the co-construction between person and culture. One cannot teach without invoking feelings of some kind. One of the functions of school ought to be to socialize students into normative ways of feeling. Values, feelings, and emotions cannot be left out of the educational process. (Contains 1 figure and 65 references.) (SLD)

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"All knowing first registers as feeling" (Sandelands, 1995)

Introduction

A Cartesian perspective considers thought to be the product of an ultimately individual, rational process. Like American culture generally, education has traditionally adhered to a Cartesian ontology. However, as stewards of mind, educators must consider the conceptual and ethical issues of an "individualist view of knowledge" (Gergen, 1994, p. 3). In particular, one must eventually confront the issue of whether or not it is possible, as a rational view of mind suggests, to sift learning from its social and emotional concomitants.

In this paper, we will argue that an individualist view of teaching and learning, based on a Cartesian world-view, unwittingle leads to our abdication of responsibility as educators of the emotions. Instead, we propose a sociogenic perspective (De Graaf & Maier, 1994), a way of thinking about what it is to be human that urges us to consider that in schools we not only teach learners how to think, we also teach them how to feel. A sociogenic perspective holds that mind cannot be packaged as a set of universal cranium-bound routines operating according to principles of logic or reason. Instead, mind and knowledge are both fundamentally and essentially relational. By expanding our theories of education beyond the quest for universal psychological principles, we broaden our definitions of teaching and learning. We also have an opportunity to review a fundamental feature of human experience, one typically omitted from rational models of mind, that of emotion. Our argument is not simply that emotion "impacts" learning, but that it is an essential constituent of it.

We will begin by looking at traditional explanations of emotion, that is, those "essentialist" views which regard emotions as intrinsic and naturally endowed. We examine the pervasiveness of this attitude within American culture generally. Next, we challenge this view by looking critically at the culturally constructed, normative dimension of emotion (that is, the notion that one ought to experience or express emotion x in situation y). Deepening our challenge to essentialist views, we then evaluate evidence for the central role of language in mediating our emotional experiences. Finally, we approach learning environments as an opportunity for the mediation of

emotion at two levels: (a) in face-to-face, human interaction (1st order mediation) and, (b) through emotions as they are vicariously experienced through texts (2nd order mediation). We argue that such an approach, by acknowledging the artificial separation of emotion and cognition, defines knowing in a more complete and a more human way, as "a dynamic system of meaning in which the affective and the intellectual unite" (Vygotsky, 1986, p. 10).[1]

The Essentialist View of Emotion

Nativism. Tomkins describes affect as "the primary innate biological motivating mechanism" (1982, p. 354), arguing, as do others (Bowlby, 1988; Darwin, 1872; Plutchik, 1980), that different emotions have played important adaptive roles in human evolution. Emotions are presumed to constitute a class of behaviors selected by their survival value to the species in general. From this essentialist standpoint (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990), certain basic emotions constitute natural and endogenous entities, "ontological existants" (Gergen, 1994, p. 146). At the core of emotions such as joy, distress, fear, disgust, shame, or sadness lies an assumed "essence," presumably genetic. Owing to their evolutionary origins, an essentialist view must consider such essences as universal, largely independent of time and culture. Of course, the view that a particular emotion represents a tangible universal entity qualifies it for analysis and explanation through empiricist methods.[2]

From an essentialist view, emotion is a "non-cognitive, involuntary phenomenon which, though capable of influencing intelligence, language and culture, [is] not itself essentially dependent upon these complex and historically conditioned factors" (Harre, 1986, pp. 2-3). Thinking, on the other hand, is presumed to occur within the confines of the mind where, like gravity in the material world, the principle of reason keeps one's intellectual feet rooted in firm ontological ground. Regardless of the various ways in which thinking is said to occur, (a) it is typically relegated to the head and (b) it is assumed to be distinct from, or even in opposition to, the

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[1] We will be using the terms "affect" and emotion" interchangeably, acknowledging that some theorists make distinctions between the two.

[2] This project of essentialism, like any construct psychology, is particularly prone to behaviorism's legitimate claims regarding the "fundamental circularity" [to borrow a phrase from Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (1991)] of cognitivist views. Regarding essentialist views, Skinner writes that "feelings are inferred from the behavior they are used to explain" (1974, p. 70). [In logic, referred to as the problem of the excluded middle, that is, the absence of "B" in A=B=C].

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affective components of experience. Gardner (1987) in fact proposes the non-inclusion of affect as one of the five definitive features of cognitive science.

For some essentialists, the face serves as the principal site for obtaining information about the emotions. Essentialists offer evidence against the cultural relativity of basic emotions by citing data in which citizens of different cultures can be shown to label photos of certain facial expressions in the same way (Ekman, 1982). The fact that human newborns are capable of displaying a full range of facial expressions is also presumed to support the essentialist argument that the communicative function of emotion in the human face is, in fact, cultural overlay. Like the voice, culture has presumably drafted an innate and preexisting biological function into a secondary role as a means of managing our connections with one another (Tomkins, 1982).

The amount of empirical research into the emotions is vast. For the most part, however, it appears to orbit around two compelling issues (Reeve, 1992), both of which assume an essentialist viewpoint. The first of these concerns the degree to which emotions are cognitive versus physiological in nature while the second issue seeks to clarify questions regarding the actual number of emotions.[3]

Emotion and The Self. In Western culture, we typically conceive of "The Self" as constituting a form of endogenous, bounded entity (Gergen, 1991). In the social sciences, this assumption surfaces most prominently in the psychoanalytic tradition of object relations (Hamilton, 1988), where the most basic psychological unit consists of the trinity of self, object, and the "emotional energy" which binds them.[4] Since both self and object are animated by this energy and, in fact, can only come into being through it, emotions are considered to comprise the very essence of personal being, "the core of the self, the seat of our individuality" (Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990, p. 6).

As a result, when we perceive that an individual is unable

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[3] Watson (1984) takes this second issue to an extreme by arguing that a number of apparently diverse scales of constructs such as trait anxiety, neuroticism, ego strength, general maladjustment, repression-sensitization, and social desirability are in fact measures of the same stable and pervasive attribute, a presumably context-independent trait Watson refers to as negative affectivity.

[4] According to Hamilton, "an object is a person, place, thing, idea, fantasy, or memory invested with emotional energy (love or hate or more modulated combinations of love and hate). An external object is a person, place, or thing invested with emotional energy. An internal object is an idea, fantasy, or memory pertaining to a person, place, or thing" (1988, p. 7).

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to cope or adapt, we tend to conclude that there is some type of "disorder" in the person's emotional system. In using phrases like "emotionally impaired" in educational settings, for example, we are lead to locate the problem's origins within the student, presumably as some kind of deficit or flaw. We are advised by experts that in order for such a student to learn effectively, he or she "must first receive successful therapy to eliminate his or her emotional disturbance" (Wong, 1996, p. 46).

The pervasive essentialism of our emotional folk theories is apparent in phrases such as "emotional problem," "getting in touch with our feelings," "speaking from the heart," or when we refer to a feeling as "erupting." The term catharsis is commonly used to imply an experience in which feelings that were once inside, contained under pressure, have moved or shifted in some significant way: we have "gotten our feelings out." In short, any metaphor that somehow situates the emotions as fundamentally interior, whose origins are deep within the body or psyche, implies an essentialist ontology.

The essentialist view in education.

In assuming that the mind is first and foremost a logical concern, educators generally seek to provide students with information about the world. This is formally achieved by means of the curriculum, through which we subdivide the world into neatly manageable slices: math, science, geography, history, literacy, and language arts, for example. Each slice, or "subject," is presumed to reflect a different aspect of the world and thus to contain a specific content we wish our students to master. Whether we view learners as blank slates or as Piagetian constructivists makes no difference, the assumption is that thinking occurs within the confines of the individual mind. Further, from a Cartesian perspective, thinking consists in the operation of mind on internal representations of an external, mind-independent reality.

Ideas about how minds come to learn thus emerge from a background of cultural beliefs regarding the nature of mind. The pedagogical practices that follow these beliefs constitute what Olson and Bruner refer to as a folk pedagogy (1996, p. 13), common opinions regarding the best ways to teach. By far the most common of these presupposes that to know anything means to possess a pertinent body of information. Therefore, the job of one who teaches is to transmit what is known in such a way that it can be received by the mind of the learner.

In this view, knowledge is a thing (e.g., facts, principles, theories, formulas) passed from one mind to another, a process from which emotion is thought to be excluded. We do not typically think of ourselves as "passing" emotion from one mind to another, for example. First, the individual is already presumed to be endowed with his or her own emotional system (we speak of "owning" our feelings, for example). Second, minds per se are typically considered the province of rational thought and

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not the locus of emotions, which are generally regarded as more intuitively sensed or embodied (a "think tank," for example, refers to a gathering of minds rather than an emotional collective). Instead, educating the emotions is thought to be accomplished via the explicit teaching of a set of rules for how various emotions are appropriately controlled and expressed.[5]

Two examples serve to illustrate this essentialist view in education. Oatley and Nundy have written a chapter which they title "Rethinking the Role of Emotions in Education" (Olson & Torrance, 1996). Their chapter argues that "it is the affective component that guides a student's attention and is the primary determinant of achievement in school" (p. 258). We can realize the importance of emotion in education, they claim, by simply observing how learning is compromised in the presence of emotional disorders. More evidence, according to the authors, comes from the school effectiveness literature where, controlling for child background and ability, relationships exist between a school's social environment and presumed indicators of affect such as incidence of emotional disorder, attendance rates, or attitudes toward learning.

Another essentialist view of emotion in education comes from Daniel Goleman (Goleman, 1995) who has recently popularized the concept of Emotional Intelligence. Goleman attributes many of the ills of American society to a lack of "emotional literacy," defined as a skill and comfort in expressing one's emotions. Goleman describes a glut of social problems that he argues can be linked to a lack of emotional fluency. The solution, Goleman argues, is for schools to teach children how to become fluent in feeling, recognizing, and expressing their emotions and to do this with as much vigor as we attempt to teach them how to read and write.

For Oatley and Nundy (1996) as well as Goleman (1995), emotions are seen as constituting something that stands fundamentally apart from cognition. At the same time, Oatley and Nundy (Oatley & Nundy, 1996) assert that thinking and feeling and "are inseparable." This is a contradiction, a conceptual ambiguity whose result is the construal of the mind as battle field, the site of a cognitive-affective tug-o-war. For example, Goleman depicts how the mind can be "emotionally hijacked" and the grave consequences that follow when "passions overwhelm reason," for example. Contrarily, through casual attributions, the reverse can occur: cognition can have direct effects on

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[5] Although we can be said to "express" and "share" both thoughts and feelings, we understand the expression of thought and the expression of emotion to be quite different, accomplishing different purposes. One is presumed to serve an intellectual function while the other constitutes a more personal act.

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emotion.[4]

Essentialist authors also give clear indications that this marriage should entail a subjugation of the emotions to reason. In the face of claims that thinking and feeling "cannot be disentangled" (Oatley & Nundy, 1996), instead of suggestions for how education might begin to truly integrate emotion and intellect, we are issued invitations such as the following:

> Let us distinguish purely cognitive aspects of education - aimed at passing on cultural skills and defined in research terms as the acquisition, representation, transformation, and use of knowledge, from the affective aspects, defined in terms of emotions and attitudes to such knowledge and to the teachers who make it available (Oatley & Nundy, 1996 p. 259).

Consequences for Education of an Essentialist View. Essentialism leads to a certain body of assumptions regarding teaching and learning. First, essentialism presents intractable programs regarding the nature of the very selves we are presumed to teach. If we define the core experience of self as a fundamental awareness that one constitutes an origin of his or her thoughts, feelings, and perceptions, from an essentialist perspective, where are we to locate this originary point of thought? If self is a function of mind, from which the emotions are presumably separate, then emotion becomes something fundamentally outside self, not central to it. If instead, with the object relations theorists, we presume that self is in fact most visibly expressed through the emotions, then who or what is managing the mind? If self stands somehow apart, neither in mind nor in the emotions, where exactly does it stand (Varela, et al., 1991)? Finally, if self, traditionally construed as a unitary construct, is instead considered an aspect of both mind and emotion, how is it that we become divided against ourselves, that the mind-self manages to be "overcome" by the emotion-self, for example, or that events in one domain (emotion-self) influence events in the other (mind-self)?

By considering thinking and feeling as constituting two distinct systems, an essentialist view fragments the activity of learning. Further, by equating self with the rational mind, essentialism requires students to identify with their "intelligence," an intelligence narrowly defined and assessed as the capacity for verbal and mathematical thought (Gardner, 1993). This may be one of the initial ways in which schools begin to alienate learners from themselves.

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[4] This struggle is an ancient image in Western culture, harkening back at least to Plato's Phaedrus in which the soul is divided into three: a charioteer and his twin steeds - one virtuous and the other wanton.

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A second consequence for education of an essentialist view has to do with the fact that learning always occurs in the context of some type of relation. Whether this relation is with an actual person (peer, parent, mentor), a voice which speaks to us through cultural artifacts (a book or artwork, for example), or natural object (stars, rocks, amoebas), learning co-occurs with feelings and attitudes toward an 'other' of some kind. But by placing the essence of emotions within the body, an essentialist view camouflages the cultural foundations that govern our interactions with the world (Gergen, 1994; Harre, 1986), including those between teacher and student; it confounds causal and moral orders. In so doing, essentialism misconstrues the fundamentally relational nature of knowing.

Third, essentialism allows us to continue defining emotional, social, and cognitive development as something akin to the sedimentation of geological layers. The core of basic emotions are presumed to appear quite early in life and whose quality is not assumed to be fundamentally changed by the overlay of subsequent social and cognitive development. Rather, one's emotional displays are expected become more appropriate. Emotional maturity assumes that one's expression of basic emotions has become more sophisticated or refined, although primitive or more immature displays will presumably "break through" on occasion. At the same time, the qualitative essence of emotions is presumably unchanging: we do not assume that emotions such as anger, joy, surprise, and fear are categorically different at age two than at age forty, only displayed in more mature ways.

From a disciplinary perspective, each "layer" continues to be the province of different disciplines or sub-disciplines (ethology, anthropology, sociology, psychology [developmental social, or cognitive], for example) each with their own agenda, their own lexicon and methods of understanding. At the same time, for the educator, the daily complexities of classroom life deny one the luxury of focusing exclusively on a specific ontological layer. More appropriate to the practical task of teaching is an understanding of how separate domains interact. What goes on in the tissue of relations by which different domains constitute one another?

Watching a group of seven and eight year-olds work collaboratively on a composition and editing text, for example, one realizes that emotions do not appear sui generis but are emergent only in a messy multi-layered confluence of relationships. The signs, symbols, and artifacts which mediate these relationships mediate feelings, not simply ideas; meaning entails both. Instructing others cannot be reduced to the simple passing on of autonomous skills, viewing "literacy" simply as the acquisition of technical competencies in reading and writing, for example (Street, 1988). Ultimately, we do not teach meanings but how to make them.

<u>Evidence for an alternate view: The sociogenic perspective</u>

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In conceptualizing the human emotions as social in origin it is possible to distinguish between weak and strong versions. In the weak version it is acknowledged that the objects to which a given emotion applies are sociocultulturally mediated but it is assumed that all humans experience essentially the same emotions (e.g., what makes an individual angry in one culture may not in other and vice versa). The strong sociogenetic perspective maintains however that both what emotions we experience and the intentional objects to which they apply are culturally variable and historically changing. In the former the social is merely facilitative while from the latter (strong) perspective the social is formative. From the latter perspective, since it appears that there are in fact culturally and historically diverse emotions, the spectrum of human affect is considered by many to be an open, rather than closed, system (Armon-Jones, 1985; D'Andrade & Strauss, 1992; Harre, 1983, pp. 123-135; Harre, 1986; Lutz & White, 1986; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990).

The Sociogenic Perspective

A new ontology. The "cognitive revolution" of the 1960's and 70's represented a backlash in the social sciences against behaviorist attempts to disqualify subjective experience as a valid object of science. This backlash spawned cognitivism, a perspective which assumes that the mind operates according to its ability to internally record and manipulate representations of the world (Varela, et al., 1991). From a cognitivist stance, perception more-or-less "smuggles the world into the mind" where cognitive rules structure the flow of information (Bruner, 1996, p. 9).

Recently, some have proclaimed the birth of a second cognitive revolution, a "new ontological paradigm" (Harré & Van Langenhove, 1991). Sometimes referred to as "the discursive turn," this movement represents yet another theoretical recoiling, this time against the perceived individualism of the first cognitive revolution. This movement encompasses a family of theories who, as a group, argue that mind cannot be packaged apart from its social origins and nature. These would include, for example, discursive psychology (Edwards & Potter, 1992; Harré & Stearns, 1995), social constructionism (Gergen, 1985; Gergen, 1994), cultural-historical theory (Cole, 1996; Vygotsky, 1986; Wertsch, 1991), dialogism (Burbules, 1993; Hermans, Kempen, & van Loon, 1992; Markova & Foppa, 1990; Rommetveit, 1990; Wertsch, 1990), and some feminist writers (Hare-Mustin & Marecek, 1990; Hubbard, 1989; Keller, 1989; Morawski, 1990; Nelson, Megill, & McCloskey, 1987; Stevenson, 1991). After De Graaf and Maier, we will refer to this second cognitive revolution generally as the sociogenic perspective (1994). In this view, emotions become interesting not as some deeply inner process but for how the they acquire meaning and force within specific relational contexts, where they exist as "pragmatic acts and communicative

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performances" (Abu-Lughod & Lutz, 1990, p. 11).

Although it is important to acknowledge that various sociogenic perspectives each contain a number of distinctive assumptions, these are not "differences that make a difference" in terms of two general ontological assumptions being made (Gover & Gavelek, 1996). First, there is general acknowledgement regarding the constitutive role of semiotic functions (language, signs, and symbols) as embedded in human practices. Second, the social remains primary while the individual emerges only out of interaction. These two assumptions are generally referred to as mediation and emergence, respectively.

Mediation. According to Vygotsky (1986), language is not a passive channel for the conveyance of self-contained meanings, a medium autonomous from the purposes to which it is put. Instead, language should be regarded as psychological tool which both constitutes and mediates human action at individual and social levels. In this view, the fundamental human reality is not a positivist world of definable objects, nor is it even the innate Self or soul. It is how we talk to one another about these things (Harre, 1983, p. 58). Thus, a basic premise of a sociogenic perspective is the notion of mediation. Unlike other forms of life, humans are born into a world of complex and preexisting cultural practices that must be acquired in order for both the individual and species to survive.

An important form of enculturation therefore involves the acquisition of semiotically-based practices, especially those involving language. Shotter (1993) writes that

> the expression of a thought or an intention, the saying of a sentence or the doing of a deed, does not issue from already well-formed and orderly cognitions at the center of our being, but originates in a person's vague, diffuse and unordered feelings - their sense of how, semiotically, they are 'positioned' in relation to the others around them" (p. 63, italics in original).

The assumption that thought and action are mediated by cultural signs and symbols obviates the project of locating discrete psychological constructs within the bounded minds of individuals; consciousness itself becomes a social achievement. According to Wertsch, in this view "even psychological processes carried out by an individual in isolation are viewed as involving processes of a communicative nature" (1991, p. 13).

Emotion and language. In general, everyday folk theories of mind presume that the mind can be characterized by a mental process or state for which our language has expressions such as knowing, thinking, enlightened, confused, and so forth (Whiten, 1991). The word "emotion" is derived from the latin roots e- (out) and movere (move); literally, "a movement outward." It is interesting to contrast this with common notions in which the

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mind is presumed to apprehend or receive the world. We say, for example, that we "take in" a movie, or that we "grasp," "seize," or "capture" an idea. This notion that emotional movement instead is somehow outward is not completely misleading: feelings are always intended toward something. Further, it is only through our ability to create, negotiate, and dissolve our emotional connections to other persons that we move about in the world.

At the same time, words like "grasp," "seize," or "capture" used to indicate comprehension are of course intended metaphorically. We even use quotes on occasion to mark them as words which are not to be taken in their literal sense. However, it is a real dilemma of language that such metaphors are useful only to the extent that we continue to borrow meaning from their literal reference. For example, a remark such as "I grasp your idea" means something only with reference to the likeness between mental comprehension and the physical clutching of an object, a comparison that we might agree greatly oversimplifies the nature of understanding. To say that these are only figures of speech presumes that the meaning of a word is either literal or non-literal and that there is no type of meaning that lies in between. Studies of metaphor in fact suggest that the power of language to communicate meaning derives from the very ability to draw on common, vital, and powerful aspects of our embodiment, experiences such as seeing, sensing, and feeling whose qualities frame our understanding of the world in general.

According to essentialism, although they appear together, thought is distinct from one's feeling response toward it, an object of emotion that does not include it in essence. Emotion is more-or-less an aesthetic response to events witnessed on some higher mental stage. Such theories are not the product of scientific evidence. Instead, they have deep cultural roots. These insinuate themselves into our everyday folk psychologies regarding how minds work (Gergen, 1994). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1980), we can discern these through common metaphors, especially in remarks like the following:

> The discussion fell to the emotional level, but I raised it back up to the rational plane. We put our feelings aside and had a high-level intellectual discussion of the matter. He couldn't rise above his emotions (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 17, italics in original).

This language can be revealing. Since "up" and "down" are associated with "good" and "bad," it implies that rational thinking is good, more sophisticated, on a higher plane than emotion, which is portrayed as somehow bad, lower and more primitive, a contaminate of intellectual thought.

<u>The meaning of emotional displays</u> We are instructed in our emotions, guided by a culture through whom we learn what one

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"ought" to feel in certain situations. Harre (1994) makes the cogent argument that a "feeling" is not necessarily an emotion; we regularly experience a variety of feelings that nonetheless fail to count as emotions (the need for food, sleep, elimination, for example). For a feeling to qualify as an emotion, according to Harre (1994), also requires the presence of two things: (a) an expression of judgement (e.g., jealousy as an expression of the belief that someone else has something that oneself should have), and, in most cases, (b) the performance of a social act or function (e.g., anger as an act of protest whereby another is positioned as the offending person)(Harre & Gillett, 1994, p. 146). These requirements index the cultural "rules" for the correct use of emotional words.

Of course, judgements and social acts are embedded in a local moral order, a system of "rules and distinctions of worth that provide the context of what inspires a particular emotion" (Turski, 1991, p. 385). In this way, the local moral order, that is, the norms, customs, and related expectations of a specific culture, are constitutive of emotions themselves. Our emotional feelings about our relations to others are not ontologically independent of the actions and words through which feelings are expressed.

Emergence. A sociogenic view argues that essentialism misconstrues the fundamental process by which mind and culture create one another. From a sociogenic viewpoint, any activity is the simultaneous product of multiple levels of development: phylogenetic (evolutionary), cultural-historical, ontogenetic (individual), and microgenetic (development of a particular activity). The argument of those sharing a social epistemology is that there is a "coming-into-existence," an emergence that occurs as one moves from one ontological stratum to another.[1] In this way, the psychological emerges from but is not reducible to the biological, the social emerges from but is not reducible to the psychological, and so on. Higher psychological functions have roots that cannot be traced to a single stratum; they are instead "boundary phenomena" that appear only as one moves across developmental domains. They emerge from and are sustained by our continual movement between individual and collective experience, and personal and public interpretations of that experience.

Rom Harre proposes what he terms the "Vygotsky Space" as a schematic model by which to understand how uniquely human, higher psychological processes (e.g., emotions) are individually acquired (figure #1). His model allows us to conceive of

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[1] From a sociogenic viewpoint, any activity is the simultaneous product of multiple levels of development: phylogenetic (evolutionary), cultural, ontogenetic (individual), and microgenetic (development of a particular activity). Each of these genetic domains is characterized by its own rate of change as well as its own unique explanatory principles (Wertsch, 1991).

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emotions (in Quadrant 4) as phenomena that are privately realized but publicly, socially, or collectively defined. In addition, the Vygotsky Space provides a useful framework by which to conceptualize the role of classroom discourse in children's emotional development.

The Vygotsky Space is formed by the overlaying of two bipolar dimensions, one private <-----> public (referring to where a state, condition, or process is realized), and the other social <-----> individual (referring to where it is defined) (Harre, 1985). Together these dimensions describe a space consisting of four quadrants: 1) public-social; 2) public-individual; 3) private-individual; and 4) private-social. At any given time an individual's cognitive/affective functioning may be located in one of these four quadrants. Following Vygotsky, Harre proposes that in the course of their development, individuals move sequentially and dialectically through these quadrants.

Harre further identifies four processes that characterize these developmental transitions between successive quadrants. The process of **appropriation** refers to the movement of thinking from the public to the private domain. While no longer visible, individual thinking is still strongly social in nature. **Transformation** refers to the process by which individuals' personalize and make these earlier social ways of thinking/feeling their own. **Publication** refers to the process by which individuals' now transformed and individualized ways of thinking are once again made public for others to respond to. Finally, **conventionalization** describes the process by which individuals' public manifestations of thinking/feeling are incorporated as part of the conventions of the discourse communities within of which they participate.

Dialogicality as a quality of mediation and emergence. An important ontological principle underlying both mediation and emergence is that the world does not consist of things in themselves but of the relations, the history of interactions, the difference between things. Whether one thinks in terms of words, developmental domains, or persons, for example, one realizes that there is never a text without context, no meaningful word without the reservoir of past and future words to which that word is directed. The dialogical principle also foregrounds time in the sense that development itself (whether of persons or activities) cannot be thought of apart from the dialogue between events and our responses to them. For example, through a history of interactions between self and other, we develop a feeling-attitude toward our own existence. At the same time, we appropriate a set of cultural expectations for how relationships, our dialogues with those around us, are best formed, sustained, and broken off. It is through feelings of self-in-relation that higher mental processes originate (Shotter, 1993), similar to Bakhtin's claims that from a dialogic perspective "the very capacity to have consciousness is based on otherness...the

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differential relation between a center and all that is not that center" (Holquist, 1990, p. 18).

Educating the Emotions

The semiotic mediation of emotion: Implications for education. Traditionally, affect has been banished to the "hidden" curriculum as something which educators are to assiduously avoid. This may occur for a variety of reasons. Among many individuals there is a strong yearning for a return to the basics - a conception of educative experience that sees little place for matters affective. Alternatively, there are those who believe the affective domain to be central to education so long as it is consistent with their own values. In the wake of this "my values or no values at all" atmosphere the classroom has increasingly become a battleground for the hearts and minds of our children. What are taken as the competing values of this or that group are presented as thee values with the result being either the hegemony of one perspective, or more often than not, an axiological stalemate in which teachers are either backed into a default mode of using impoverished instructional practices with denuded texts - or teaching against the grain. In either case, a formative role of education in the emotional development of students is minimized.

The school classroom is pregnant with meanings to be interpreted. It thus represents an important context for learning the human emotions, the objects toward which they are to be directed, and the process of valuation. In understanding how classroom experiences can foster both emotional socialization and transformation it is useful to distinguish between the first- and second-order mediation of an individuals' emotional experiences and meanings. On the one hand, first-order mediation refers to the guided interpretation of emotional situations based upon face-to-face interactions. The day-to-day goings on of classroom life present a myriad of occasions that necessitate interpreting what emotion a given individual is (or ought be) feeling in her encounters with others. In contrast, the second order mediation of emotions occurs, vicariously, through an individual's interaction with written texts. Thus, an important dimension of comprehending the meaning of a literary text involves the readers' ability to understand the range of emotions attributed by an author to different characters within a story line. Such a distinction is not hard and fast. One may witness students debating amongst themselves what emotion a given fictionalized character is likely to feel. Here the face-to-face and text-mediated interpretations may meld together (see endnote 1).

A sociogenetic perspective underscores the importance of classroom discourse in the education of children's emotions. "If emotions are social phenomena, then emotion discourse is crucial to understanding how they are so constituted" (Turski, 1994). Turski argues for what he terms an "expressivist account" of emotions in that our emotions acquire form through our attempts

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to articulate the sense of the situation that moves us.

> Expressions manifest our emotions and put us in the presence of the emotions of others. Through the common medium of expression, emotions thus become in a very general and perfectly understandable sense public phenomena. Indeed, the constitutive function of expression is precisely what allows one to suggest that for any given community there must be essential or logical connections between particular emotions and corresponding expressions. Without some such intersubjectively shared "grammar," our knowing what others feel as well as feigning and deception become incomprehensible.

The emergence of emotion: Implications for education. The emergent quality of emotion has important implications for education. It suggests a responsibility on our part for an increased awareness that the fundamental processes underlying teaching and learning are relational not transmissive. Gill (1995) compares learning to a dance between the knower and the known. The world is not a static reality, knowledge of which is transferred from teacher to student. Students dance with the world and, like a dance, there is a sensitive, embodied interaction between these partners from which thoughts and emotions, i.e., knowledge, emerges (Egan, 1992; Gallas, 1994; Heshusius & Ballard, 1996; McEwan & Egan, 1995).

Following de Sousa (1980), Turski suggests that we educated into ways of feeling through prototypical "emotion-learning situations" referred to as paradigm scenarios (Turski, 1991, p. 376).[5] These are early situations in which a child behaves in a way that is interpreted as a certain feeling (anger, sadness) by those around him or her (typically family) who provide the child with a name for it. As she enters school, the child is presented with a new framework of scenarios that begin to amplify and expand her feeling-attitude toward herself, particularly toward herself as a learner. For some students, these scenarios are positive (they may experience pride at performing well in an academic or athletic event, for example). For other students, especially those identified as having syndromes like attention deficit or hyperactivity, it is telling that the quality of their emotions often does not become a pressing issue until they start school. The mark of emergent cultural artifacts are that they are often most conspicuous during periods of transition or change

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[5] This is similar to Wittgenstein's (1953) argument that children come to understand mental terms not in terms of internal mental events but through their relationship to publicly events observable to the language community. Whiten and Perner ask, "Else how could the meaning of the terms be mutually agreed?" (Whiten, 1991, p. 11).

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from one culture to another.

Harre's Vygotsky Space is richly heuristic in conceptualizing the relationship between the discourse students participate in and the emotional distinctions that they are able to make. This model allows us to conceive of emotions (in Quadrant 4) as phenomena that are privately realized but publicly, socially, or collectively defined. In addition, the Vygotsky Space provides a useful framework by which to conceptualize the role of classroom discourse in children's emotional development. This model calls our attention to several important features about the emotional discourse of the classroom.

- the importance of public/social discourse (it is here where meanings are made "visible").
- it is in classroom discourse where distinctions of worth that characterize a culture's local moral order are made accessible.
- adult (teacher) mediation of discourse is thus a powerful and vital influence of such distinction of worth.
- class rooms feature a constant intermingling of the cognitive/intellectual and the affective/interpersonal.
- it is not a case of mere emotional socialization; it is assumed that children also actively transform and extend emotional meanings to new objects.
- the narrative "emplotment" (Polkinghorne, 1988) of emotions: emotional "oughts" become known to children through both their direct involvement and the textually mediated experience of "paradigm scenarios" (Turski, 1991).[1]
- it is through the public expression of face-to-face and textually based experiences of emotions that children learn the political, valuational, and moral dimensions of emotions.

The emergent quality of emotion means that educators must attempt to understand the quality of students' experience from a cultural and historical standpoint. Garrison (1995) presents the example of "Tony," an non-literate 11-year old whose life had been spent traveling with a carnival. When he finally entered school at the fifth grade, a psychologist's report evaluated Tony's IQ as in the 5th percentile. This is, of course, a

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[1] Turski writes that "the basic claim here is that to learn and experience an emotion is essentially to live out a certain story...that story will be predominantly, if not essentially, metaphorical in nature" (1991, p. 380). McEwan and Egan add their voices to this argument: "By focusing on narrative in education we hope to find ways of returning to the content of the curriculum, and to other features of teaching and learning, the human emotions that alone can give them adequate meaning and fulfillment" (McEwan & Egan, 1995, p. viii).

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completely decontextualized assessment. It places "the problem" within Tony, taking no account of the fact that the emergence of such problems are as much a reflection of cultural values as qualities of Tony per se (reading and writing was not an expectation in Tony's carnival culture). As a result, Tony was recommended for special education.

An observant teacher intervened for Tony - her experience of him in the classroom did not agree with the psychological snapshot. Tony remained in her classroom and gradually became literate. Garrison writes that Tony was helped only through "a continuous, ongoing artistic process of communication that involved being sensitive to Tony's needs and emotions" (p. 428, italics added). Garrison cites Dewey's statement that "'reason' at its height cannot attain complete grasp...It must fall back upon imagination - upon the embodiment of ideas in an emotionally charged sense" (in Garrison, 1995, pp. 428-429).

Summary and conclusions.

An educational context is characterized by multiple dimensions, including the immediate flow of words, actions, and feelings which regulate human relationships and the identities that populate them. In spite of the fact that the classroom is a setting rich in opportunities for emotional socialization, it has been neglected as a context for educating the emotions. From a sociogenic viewpoint, in terms of classroom process, there is no such thing as a level of "pure" knowledge, one that has no affective (social) dimension. Similarly, there is no such thing as a level of "pure" affect existing apart from the meanings and understandings (knowledge) by which it is partly constituted.

The mediation of emotion suggests that emotions, as we experience them in our daily lives, are a social construct. Like any cultural artifact, were human relationships to disappear, so would emotions (especially self-conscious emotions of pride, shame, and embarrassment). At the same time, as Harre's Vygotsky Space illustrates (see figure #1), although emotions are collectively/publicly defined, they are experienced on the site of the individual (yet according to normative rules). Thus, emotions index the relational process, the co-construction, between person and culture. They are contained neither solely "in" the individual nor "in" the culture but are an emergent property of the ongoing relation of the two.

We end by arguing argue two points. First, one cannot teach without invoking feelings of some kind (interest, boredom, etc.). Second, one ought not to attempt it. Prescriptively, one of the functions of school ought to be to socialize into normative (appropriate) ways of feeling. The argument between left and right is not whether this should occur, but what those ways should be. As these debates become polarized, the sides effectively cancel one another out and there is a pretense that we can somehow teach math, science, literature, history, without regard to values, feelings, and emotions.

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1. This first and second order distinction that we are suggesting is not hard and fast. One can think of mediations that are somewhat on the border of the two. For example, first order mediation is based on face-to-face encounters and second order refers to the emotional socialization that one experiences in reading a literary text. What may come between these, however, is how a teacher in a face-to-face setting positions students with respect to subject matter. The voice of a current student in the first author's undergraduate Teacher Education course provides an articulate example of Egan's theory regarding narrative knowing. That is, how narrative frameworks provide a scaffold for content knowledge, directly affecting how students feel about school subjects:

> In my own experience, I have an easier time in subjects where I can read a book and be asked to describe events. This is one reason why I love history. I really like hearing about people's lives and events. For some reason I have a very good memory when it comes to history. On tests I can simply recall events and details that interested me very easily. However, when I take a science class, I try to apply the same strategies and they don't work as well. Scientific terms may be very similar and my memory doesn't differentiate them as well. I can usually remember reading the material but I can't quite pick the correct answer. Today I had a test in physiology and I couldn't remember the difference between similar terms such as diastolic and systolic (journal entry, Spring, 1997).

One wonders how this student might have performed in physiology had she been

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helped to embed abstract scientific terms in some type of context or story-line.

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Figure 1 Vygotsky Space (adapted from Harre, 1983, after Vygotsky)



DEFINITION of state, condition or process (social vs individual) whose REALIZATION is public vs. private. Arrows denote movement of the individual.

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